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Abstract 
Ensuring energy security and mitigating climate change are key energy 
policy priorities. The recent IPCC Working Group III report emphasized 
that climate policies can deliver energy security as a co-benefit, in large 
part through reducing energy imports. Here, using five state-of-the-art 
global energy-economy models and eight long-term scenarios, we show 
that while deep cuts in greenhouse-gas emissions would indeed reduce 
energy imports, the reverse is not true: ambitious policies constraining 
energy imports would have only an insignificant impact on climate 
change. Restricting imports of all fuels would lower 21st century 
emissions by only 2%-15% against the Baseline scenario as compared to a 
70% reduction in the 450 scenario. Restricting only oil imports would 
have virtually no impact on emissions. The modeled energy 
independence targets could be achieved at policy costs comparable to 
those of existing climate pledges but a fraction of the cost of limiting 
global warming to 2°C.  
With increasing tensions between Russia and the West, the escalation of several 
crises in the Middle East, and the volatility of the oil market, energy security is on the 
top of the political agenda1-3. At the same time, world leaders have agreed to limit the 
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increase in global mean temperature to below 2°C (ref. 4) and there is a multitude of 
efforts to curb greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions5. 
Climate change mitigation policies are frequently considered to lead to significant 
energy security co-benefits, such as reduction in energy imports, slower depletion of 
non-renewable resources, and increasingly diverse energy sources6-12. Previous 
research has also explored the benefits of achieving climate and non-climate energy 
objectives simultaneously13-15. But some of these non-climate objectives, such as 
reducing energy imports, can be pursued in their own right and achieved either by 
climate-friendly measures such as constraining energy demand and expanding 
domestic renewables or by high-carbon alternatives such as increasing domestic coal 
use.  
In this study, we reverse the usual question and examine the effects of energy 
independence policies on GHG emissions. We conduct a multi-model comparison of 
these two policy objectives, using five leading global energy-economy models 
(IMAGE, MESSAGE, REMIND, WITCH and TIAM-ECN). We provide quantitative 
analysis of the interaction between strategies to reduce energy imports (both for oil 
and for all fuels together) and climate change mitigation. We address three questions 
related to this interaction. First, how would energy independence policies change 
energy systems as compared to climate policies? Second, what would be the impact 
of energy independence policies on GHG emissions? Finally, what would energy 
independence policies cost, especially in comparison with climate policies? We find 
that while climate stabilization policies would result in lower energy trade, energy 
independence policies would only decrease cumulative 21st century GHG emissions 
by 2-15% compared to a Baseline scenario. In this case, the global median 
temperature would be 3.5°C-4°C above the pre-industrial level for 2100, far 
exceeding the 2°C target agreed upon by the international community. Oil import 
restrictions would have virtually no impact on emissions or global temperature 
increase. We also show that energy import constraints would lead to decreasing fossil 
fuel and overall energy use, but not necessarily to universal expansion of renewables. 
Finally, the policy costs of the modeled energy independence targets would be a 
fraction of those of climate change stabilization. 
The concept of energy security 
Energy security is a complex policy problem that can encompass everything from 
securing oil supplies to reducing the risks of blackouts and protecting critical 
infrastructure16-19. Historically, the focus of much of the energy security literature has 
been security of supply and energy dependence20,21 but recently the concept has 
expanded to also include security of energy-related infrastructure and resilience of 
energy systems18,19,22. In this paper we follow a general definition of energy security 
as ‘low vulnerability of vital energy systems’16 which served as the basis for energy 
security assessment frameworks used in the Global Energy Assessment23, the IEA 
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Model of Short-term energy security24 and in evaluating energy security in long-term 
global scenario studies7,8,10. We delineate vital energy systems as primary energy 
supplies or specifically oil supplies for major economies.  
The vulnerability of vital energy systems can be analyzed from three distinct 
perspectives: robustness, resilience and sovereignty17. The robustness perspective 
(minimizing exposure to predictable threats such as resource scarcity25) and the 
resilience perspective (increasing the ability of vital energy systems to respond to 
disruptions22,26,27) have also been assessed in long-term scenarios8,9, but modeling 
corresponding policies has not yet been done and should be part of future research. 
We focus our analysis on the sovereignty perspective where the main vulnerabilities 
come from energy systems being controlled by foreign actors. This perspective 
prescribes energy independence as the main energy security strategy. 
Pursuing energy independence has consistently been observed across a range of 
historic periods, configurations of energy systems, levels of economic development 
and political arrangements28 and continues to shape current policy discourses2,3,29-32. 
For example, in the 2012 U.S. presidential race, President Obama pledged to cut oil 
imports by 1/3 by 202529 and the Republican candidate pledged to achieve energy 
independence by 202030. In 2010, Japan’s Basic Energy Plan aimed to double its 
energy “self-sufficiency ratio” by 203033,34 and more recently, India’s Power and Coal 
Minister vowed to stop importing coal by 201931. The level of energy imports has 
been one of the most widely used indicators of energy security in the context of long-
term scenarios9,12.  
Modeling energy independence and climate policies 
We model achieving energy independence objectives in all world regions, both 
limited to oil and extending to the overall primary energy supply. Over the last 
several decades, oil has been the main energy security concern due to its 
geographically concentrated production, perceived and real scarcity, and lack of 
substitutes, particularly in the transport, agriculture and defense sectors23,32,35. 
However, oil has not always dominated the energy security agenda, and may not in 
the future. For instance, in the 1950s and 1960s the U.S. and many Western 
European countries switched a number of power plants from coal to oil to avoid 
coal’s “high prices and irregularities in supplies”36. In the European Union, the 
energy security strategy focuses on reducing and diversifying natural gas imports2. 
Many long-term scenarios indicate that future gas trade could significantly increase, 
and coal could become the most traded fuel by mid-century8,10.  
We compare energy system changes from pursuing energy independence to reduce 
either energy or oil imports to two different climate policy scenarios from the 
literature: (1) projecting an ambitious interpretation of the Copenhagen climate 
pledges through 21006,37,38 and consistent with the Intended Nationally Determined 
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Contributions (INDCs) through 2030 (Supplementary Figure 1 and Supplementary 
Table 1); and (2) ensuring climate stabilization with universal action beginning after 
2020 and stabilizing GHG concentration at 450 ppm CO2-equivalent (CO2e) by 
210038. We also include a 500 ppm CO2e scenario38 to explore a more modest climate 
change stabilization target (Table 1). Additional scenario runs were used to test the 
robustness of the results. 
Table 1 Overview of scenarios 
Scenario Description 
Baseline A counterfactual development without climate policies or restrictions on 
energy imports38,42. (Supplementary Figure 3) 
Energy independence Restrictions on overall energy imports. Targets based on observed 
policies and trends (Table 2) are set for 2030 with the net-import level 
maintained throughout the rest of the century. In rare instances when a 
model could not achieve the target for a particular region, it was 
systematically relaxed until a solution was found (see also Methods, 
Supplementary Table 2 and Supplementary Tables 4-8). 
Oil independence All oil-importing regions cut their net import dependence in half by 2030 
and maintain that level throughout the century. In rare instances when a 
model could not achieve the target for a particular region, it was 
systematically relaxed until a solution was found (see also Methods and 
Supplementary Table 3 and Supplementary Tables 4-8). 
Pledges An ambitious interpretation of the Copenhagen climate pledges are met 
by 2020 and emission-reduction levels are extrapolated through 2100 
(see also Methods and Supplementary Table 1)37,38 
Climate stabilization - 500 Climate policies beginning after 2020 to achieve GHG stabilization at 
500 ppme by 2100. (See Supplementary Figures 5-7) 
Climate stabilization - 450 Climate policies beginning after 2020 to achieve GHG stabilization at 
450 ppme by 2100. 
Energy dependence is calculated as the net imports of all traded fuels divided by the 
total primary energy supply in a given region and year (Equation 1). For each region, 
we model energy independence targets which are at least as ambitious as empirically 
observed policies and trends: import dependent developed regions with low energy 
demand growth cut their energy imports in half by 2030 while rapidly growing 
emerging economies maintain their current relatively low level of imports for the rest 
of the century (Table 2, Supplementary Table 2). Energy exporters, including North 
America after 2030, do not become importers. These restrictions are imposed on all 
fuels and carriers represented in models to ensure that overall energy imports 
including trade in ‘new fuels’ such as bioenergy remains within the established limits 
(Table 3).  
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Table 2 Regional import reduction targets for the Energy independence scenario 
Region-type Includes Target 
1. Energy importing 
developed regions with low 
energy demand growth  
Europe and OECD regions 
other than North America 
Cut their 2010 net import dependence 
in half by 2030 and maintain that 
relative level through the 21st century. 
2. Energy importing 
emerging economies with 
high energy demand growth  
China, India and other non-
OECD Asian economies 
Maintain their current level of net-
energy imports throughout the century 
3. Energy exporters Middle East, Former Soviet 
Union, Africa, Latin America, 
and other regions which are 
net-exporters 
Never become energy importers 
4. The U.S./North American 
region 
U.S. and North America  Becomes energy independent by 2030 
and maintains energy independence , 
consistent with political debates29,30 and 
recent modeling results8,63-65. 
See Supplementary Note 1 and Supplementary Table 9 for regional definitions and 
Supplementary Tables 2-8 for quantitative regional targets. 
Oil independence is calculated as net oil imports divided by the total oil supply 
(Equation 2). In the oil independence scenario, we model a world where all 
importing regions cut their oil import dependence in half by 2030, except the 
US/North American region which goes further and becomes oil independent by 
2030. This reflects the fact that major emerging economies already have high oil 
import dependence (Supplementary Table 3). 
Table 3 Energy products which are traded in each model 
Model Energy products which are traded 
IMAGE crude oil, natural gas, coal, biomass, biofuels, hydrogen 
MESSAGE crude oil, natural gas, coal, oil products, electricity, biofuels, hydrogen, liquefied 
coal and natural gas 
REMIND crude oil, natural gas, coal, biomass 
TIAM-ECN crude oil, natural gas, coal, biomass, oil products 
WITCH crude oil, natural gas, coal 
Effect of energy independence policies on energy systems 
We find that pursuing energy independence leads to lower energy intensity 
(measured as primary energy use over Gross Domestic Product, GDP) resulting in 
lower energy demand and consequently in lower oil and gas use over the short-term 
(through mid-century) and a drop in coal use over the long-term (Figure 1, Figure 2). 
This contrasts with the strong growth in coal trade to up to four times today’s oil 
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trade volumes in the Baseline scenario8,10. Primary energy supply also drops to 
significantly lower levels in the Pledges and Climate stabilization scenarios. In the 
Energy independence scenario, an increase in renewable energy use varies from one 
model to another, though in no model does it reach the level observed under the 450 
scenario (Figure 1, Supplementary Figure 4). 
Figure 1 Primary energy development under energy independence and climate policy 
scenarios  
 
The development of (a) coal, (b) oil and gas and (c) renewables in the Baseline, energy 
independence and climate policy scenarios. Colours represent each scenario, while symbols 
distinguish the different models studied.  
The Energy independence scenario portrays three distinct regional trends for major 
21st century importers, industrialized economies, and energy exporters (Figure 2, 
Supplementary Figures 5 and 6). These groups are typified in Figure 2 by India, 
Europe, and North America and the Middle East respectively. The major importers 
(Africa, India, China, and the rest of Asia) experience a large reduction in energy 
intensity and fossil fuels supply which curtail the growth of energy imports expected 
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under the rapidly growing demand in the Baseline. The reduction in fossil energy use 
and increase in renewables in some of these regions in the Energy independence 
scenario is comparable to the Pledges scenario and in certain models even to the 
climate stabilization scenarios. This is because there is no other way to meet rapidly 
rising demand given scarce domestic fossils.  
Industrialized importers (Europe and Pacific OECD) experience a relatively modest 
reduction in the use of fossil fuels and decrease in energy demand under the Energy 
independence scenario. This is due to lower energy demand growth in the Baseline 
and thus less change is required to meet the independence targets. Regionally, the 
difference between the Climate stabilization and Energy independence scenarios is 
most pronounced for the 21st century energy exporters (Middle East, the former 
Soviet Union and North America) where there might actually be a slight increase in 
fossil fuel use under the Energy independence scenario as the global demand for oil, 
gas and coal drops. As a result, energy independence policies in importing countries 
may make it somewhat less attractive for energy exporters to decarbonize.  
The oil independence scenario shows less oil use, primarily in the transport sector 
but the energy demand and the overall fossil fuel use are almost the same as in the 
Baseline since gas and coal substitute oil (Figure 2, Supplementary Figures 5 and 6). 
Regionally, oil independence policies primarily affect energy systems in oil importing 
regions, however the Middle East experiences a small increase in domestic oil use as 
the global demand contracts Figure 2). 
Figure 2 Main energy system changes from energy independence compared to 
climate policies scenarios 
 
Panel a shows the changes at the global level while panels b-e show representative regions: 
(b) industrialized economies (Europe); (c) emerging energy-importing economies (India); 
 8 
and (d) traditional and (e) emerging exporters (Middle East and North America, 
respectively). See Supplementary Note 1 and Supplementary Table 9 for regional 
definitions. All changes are calculated compared to the Baseline energy mix (shown in 
Supplementary Figure 3). In panel a, each model’s results are depicted for each decadal 
year between 2010 and 2100. In panels b-e, each model’s results are depicted for the years 
2030, 2050 and 2100. Colors represent each scenario, while symbols distinguish the 
different models studied. 
Mutual impact of energy independence and climate policies 
The modest changes in fossil energy use in the Energy independence scenarios lead 
to a small decrease in cumulative GHG emissions: 2-15% lower than in the Baseline 
compared to over 70% reduction in the Climate stabilization scenarios and a 30-45% 
decrease under the Pledges (Figure 3). These trends correspond to roughly 3.5°C-4°C 
temperature increase above pre-industrial levels in the energy independence 
scenarios, 2.5°-3.2°C in the Pledges scenario and to no more than 2°C for the climate 
stabilization scenario (see Methods for details on warming estimates). Oil 
independence policies have almost no impact on GHG emissions (Figure 3, 
Supplementary Figures 2 and 7). 
On the other hand and consistent with other studies7,8,10,39, we find that climate 
stabilization policies reduce energy trade and energy imports by up to 75% by 2050 
(Figure 3, Supplementary Figure 1). In fact, over the long-term climate stabilization 
policies lead to lower energy imports than in the Energy independence scenario due 
to a phase out of tradable fossil fuels. Over the next couple of decades, however, the 
modeled Energy independence policies result in lower energy imports because the 
450 scenario limits the use of domestic coal. These results are different at the 
regional level, particularly depending on whether a region is an energy importer or 
exporter (Supplementary Figure 8). 
In the Pledges scenario, there is some decrease in global energy trade compared to 
the Baseline; however, this decrease is much smaller than in the Energy 
independence scenario and would not be sufficient to curtail growing energy imports 
in rapidly growing regions. This is consistent with earlier findings8 showing that 
under the Pledges scenario imports would decline in some regions (e.g. the EU) but 
would continue to grow in China and India. 
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Figure 3 Emission and energy trade impacts of energy independence and climate 
policy scenarios 
 
For the Energy independence, 450 and Pledges scenarios, the decrease is relative to total 
energy trade whereas for the Oil independence scenario, the difference is relative to global 
oil trade. Each line represents a model’s results for each decadal year between 2010 and 
2100. GHG emissions represent Kyoto gases except in TIAM-ECN where they represent 
CO2, CH4 and N2O. Colors represent each scenario, while symbols distinguish the different 
models studied. 
Policy costs of energy independence versus climate goals 
We calculate policy costs as a proxy for the relative difficulty of implementing the 
modeled targets using a cost-effective strategy (see Methods). While there is 
considerable uncertainty surrounding the policy costs of climate policies6,40-43, we 
find that the relationship between the policy costs of independence targets and 
climate policies is robust between models. The policy costs of the Energy and Oil 
independence scenarios to 2050 are between 0.1-0.3% of global GDP, which is 
comparable to those of the Pledges scenario (0.1-0.8% of global GDP) but only 
between one-fifth and one-tenth of the cost of the 450 scenario (0.4-2.4% of global 
GDP) and between one-half and one-fifth the cost of a 500 scenario (0.4-1.2%) 
(Figure 4). By 2100, the global policy costs of the Energy independence scenario in 
all models are one-tenth of the costs of the 450 scenario and one-fifth to one-seventh 
of the cost of the 500 scenario (Supplementary Figure 9). Uncertainties in these costs 
both between models and with respect to specific assumptions are shown in Figure 4 
(see also ‘Uncertainties and sensitivities’ below). 
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Figure 4 Global policy costs for energy independence and climate policy scenarios 
through 2050 
 
See Methods for calculation of policy costs. Bars show medians, markers show individual 
models. Costs are expressed in relative differences of Net Present Value from 2010 to 2050 
using a 5% discount rate compared with the Baseline scenario. In MESSAGE the full range 
of sensitivity cases for the independence scenarios is shown (see also Supplementary 
Tables 12 and 16). Colors represent each scenario, while symbols distinguish the different 
models studied. 
The policy costs of energy independence are predominantly borne by energy 
exporters (Middle East, Africa, and the former Soviet Union) because they include 
lost export revenues due to other regions limiting fossil fuel imports, for either the 
sake of energy independence or climate policies. For example, the Middle East bears 
between a quarter and three quarters of the global policy costs in the energy 
independence scenarios. The costs of climate change mitigation are more evenly 
distributed across regions for example, the Middle East’s cost burden is less than a 
third of the global policy costs in the 450 scenario (Figure 5 and Supplementary 
Table 10). 
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Figure 5 Regional policy costs for energy independence compared to climate policy 
scenarios through 2050 
 
(a) Energy independence, (b) Oil independence, (c) Pledges and (d) 450 scenarios. Note the 
450 panel is on a different scale since the costs of climate stabilization are several times 
more than the costs of the other three scenarios. The height of the bars shows median 
policy costs as % of the relevant regional GDP and the area of the bars shows total median 
policy costs of each region. Markers show the range of policy costs as % of GDP for 
individual models. Costs are expressed in Net Present Value from 2010 to 2050 using a 5% 
discount rate. See Supplementary Note 1 and Supplementary Table 9 for regional 
definitions. Colors represent regions, while symbols distinguish the different models studied. 
Uncertainties and sensitivities 
We have tested the sensitivity of our findings against three types of uncertainties: (a) 
model uncertainty, (b) parametric uncertainty, and (c) import policy uncertainty. We 
address the model uncertainty by including results from five models with different 
representations of energy-economy systems (e.g. how investment decisions are made 
and how energy demand and supply respond to policy constraints – Supplementary 
Note 2). We probed the parametric uncertainty by modeling import restrictions in 
the MESSAGE model under three baseline scenarios spanning a wide range of 
uncertainties. These scenarios are based on three distinct shared socio-economic 
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pathways (SSPs), designed by the climate change research community to explore 
how socio-economic, technological, demand and resource uncertainties might impact 
climate change mitigation and adaptation challenges44-46. We use the three SSPs 
which represent the widest range of challenges for climate change mitigation: from 
the ‘Sustainability World’ where the cost of new technologies rapidly fall and fossil 
resource availability is constrained, to a fossil-rich world with slow uptake of new 
technologies and large fossil resource availability (Supplementary Note 3). Finally, 
we also used the MESSAGE model to test the sensitivity of our results against the 
import policy uncertainty by varying the level of energy import restrictions to 50% 
higher and lower than the targets used in our Independence scenarios 
(Supplementary Note 4).  
The sensitivity analysis shows that our main findings that energy import restrictions 
would result in smaller emission reductions, more modest energy systems changes 
and require a fraction of the effort of climate change mitigation is robust across five 
models and radically different Baselines. Consistent with diagnostic indicators for 
our models from Kriegler et al.47, we find that models with more flexible energy 
demand and ‘stiffer’ supply (e.g. WITCH) show a stronger demand response and 
weaker structural response (i.e. shift to renewables) to energy import constraints 
than other models (e.g. REMIND) (Figure 1 and Supplementary Figure 6). In a fossil-
rich world with slow uptake of new technologies, restricting energy imports would 
require more extensive energy system changes and lead to more emission reductions 
(Supplementary Figure 10). However, the relative scale of changes compared to the 
Baseline and 450 scenarios would be similar to our findings (because emissions in 
the Baseline would be higher and climate stabilization would also require larger 
emission reductions). We also find that even under much stricter import constraints, 
with all regions importing less than 20% of their energy needs, the energy and 
emission changes as well as the costs are still significantly smaller than those 
required for climate stabilization (Supplementary Figure 11 and Supplementary 
Tables 15 and 16). 
While the sensitivity analysis demonstrates the overall robustness of our results, it 
also points to several key caveats. First of all, although our findings are valid under a 
wide range of baseline assumptions, one could in principle imagine baselines where 
these findings may be less pronounced. In particular, technological limitations (e.g. 
on unconventional fossils) could make achieving climate stabilization less effortful 
and achieving energy independence more difficult so that the differences between the 
effects of the two objectives would be less. We show that the cost difference between 
climate stabilization and energy independence policies declines in a ‘Sustainability 
World’ (Supplementary Table 12). Under even more limited fossils and even faster 
uptake of renewables the costs of climate stabilization and energy independence may 
both drop and further converge, especially for a more modest stabilization target. In 
addition, our exploration of model uncertainties shows that in case of more flexible 
energy demand and renewable penetration, import restrictions result in larger 
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emission reductions. Once again, it is possible to imagine a model with such high 
responsiveness of demand and share of renewables that import restrictions would 
lead to even higher emission reductions less different from those needed for climate 
stabilization. 
Conclusions 
Our analysis dispels two assumptions often present in energy and climate policy 
discourses. First, we find that the cost-effective pursuit of ambitious energy 
independence targets is not likely to result in significant reduction of GHG emissions 
nor would it universally increase renewable energy use and be sufficient for 
achieving even the climate Pledges. In other words, climate will not be saved as a 
‘side-effect’ of energy independence efforts. Secondly, our findings question the main 
(although not always explicit) assumption behind the efforts to quantify ‘co-benefits’ 
of climate policies. The assumption is that the knowledge of such co-benefits would 
automatically increase support for climate measures from advocates of non-climate 
energy policy objectives. We show that at least in case of decreasing energy imports 
this argument should be more nuanced: though stringent climate policies may 
indeed bring a considerable reduction in energy imports, a similar reduction can also 
be achieved at a fraction of the climate change mitigation cost if energy 
independence is pursued as a separate objective in its own right. This means that 
cost-sensitive political advocates of energy independence may have little reason to 
support climate stabilization policies. In other words, whether the presence of energy 
security or other ‘co-benefits’ is likely to significantly increase political support for 
climate policies should be subject to special analysis which takes into account both 
the relative costs of achieving various energy objectives and cost-sensitivity of 
political preferences for these objectives. 
Methods 
Study design 
This study is based on modeling long-term global energy scenarios using five 
integrated assessment models (IAMs): IMAGE48,49, MESSAGE50,51, REMIND52, 
TIAM-ECN53,54, and WITCH55,56 (see also Supplementary Note 5). In addition to the 
Baseline, we model two energy independence scenarios with restrictions on regional 
energy imports, and Climate stabilization scenarios which stabilize GHG 
concentration at 450 ppm CO2e or 500 ppm CO2e (by 2100) or depict regional 
pathways consistent with recent climate Pledges37. We follow a target-based policy 
approach by setting harmonized policy objectives and computing the corresponding 
policies and measures endogenously. The limitation of this study design is that it 
depicts stylized pathways to achieve policy objectives rather than the effects of 
specific policy instruments, which depend on the particular context of their 
application and interaction57-59. Investigating these dynamics requires more research 
 14 
including modeling at the national and sub-national level. Additional information on 
the scenarios is available in the online database https://secure.iiasa.ac.at/web-
apps/ene/LIMITSDB/. 
Setting energy and oil dependence targets 
Among those model regions that are also political jurisdictions, very few have 
explicitly defined energy independence targets. Japan is an exception; in its Basic 
Energy Plan from 201033,34, the country aimed to reduce its import dependence to 
64% by 2030. This ambition was weakened in the INDC 201560 due to contraction in 
nuclear power after the Fukushima accident. Ukraine, South Korea, the European 
Union and Turkey plan measures (e.g. deployment of renewables and nuclear 
energy) that will affect their import dependence to a much smaller degree. The 
targets that we set for importing economies vary between 19-50% and thus are more 
ambitious than one of the countries with the strongest historical commitment to 
energy security61,62. This is by design. If we were to model weaker, and perhaps more 
realistic energy independence policies, the energy and emissions impacts that we 
find would be even smaller.  
We set the energy independence targets based on the 2010 level and the trend in the 
development of the energy system over the century (Table 2 and Supplementary 
Table 2). Developed regions with high net-import dependence today and low 
projected energy demand growth cut their energy imports in half by 2030 and 
maintain this level throughout the century. Developing and emerging economies 
with relatively lower energy imports today maintain their current level of net import 
dependence throughout the century; this contrasts with the development in most of 
these regions under the Baseline of rapidly rising energy imports. Finally, energy 
exporters never become importers. The U.S./North American region is projected to 
become energy independent within the next several decades even under the 
Baseline8,63-65; thus for this region, we model energy independence by 2030 and 
maintaining that level throughout the century. 
Import restrictions for oil independence are set as the same for all importing regions 
since most developing and emerging economies already have high net oil import 
dependence (Supplementary Table 3). All oil-importing regions cut their 2010 oil 
imports in half by 2030 and maintain that level throughout the century. The one 
exception is the U.S./North America region which achieves oil independence by 
2030 since under the Baseline, it becomes self-sufficient in oil due to the 
development of unconventionals. 
Regional energy and oil import restrictions are set for native model regions 
(Supplementary Tables 4-8). The independence targets are met with a 10% tolerance 
interval. Under Energy independence, in TIAM-ECN, the South Korean target was 
relaxed to 60% (from 45%) and small deviations were made in Mexico and Eastern 
Europe in the latter half of the century: in Mexico, the target was relaxed from no 
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imports to 31% import dependence and in Eastern Europe to 35% from a target net 
import dependence of 20%. In the Oil independence scenarios, in MESSAGE in the 
North America region the target was delayed till 2040. On the global level, these 
relaxations represent less than 5% of global energy trade and on the regional level, 
the energy independence levels are still quite stringent compared to the Baseline 
development. 
Calculating net import dependence 
Net import dependence (NID) is calculated by summing the net energy trade 
(imports minus exports) of all primary energy sources and secondary energy carriers 
for a give region and year and then dividing by the respective total primary energy 
supply (Equation 1). We calculate the NID for each model for all fuels which it trades 
(see Representation of energy trade in the models).  
Equation 1 Calculating net import dependence 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟,𝑦𝑦 =  ∑𝑃𝑃 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟,𝑦𝑦 + 𝑆𝑆 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑟𝑟,𝑦𝑦–𝑃𝑃 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟,𝑦𝑦 − 𝑆𝑆 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟,𝑦𝑦𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟,𝑦𝑦  
where: 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟,𝑦𝑦 = the net energy import dependence in region 𝑖𝑖 in year 𝑝𝑝 , 
𝑃𝑃 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟,𝑦𝑦 = the total primary energy imports, 
𝑆𝑆 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟,𝑦𝑦 = the total secondary energy imports, 
𝑃𝑃 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟,𝑦𝑦 = the total primary energy exports, 
𝑆𝑆 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟,𝑦𝑦 = the total secondary energy exports, and 
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟,𝑦𝑦 = the total primary energy supply. 
The oilNID is calculated as the difference between crude oil and oil product imports 
and crude oil and oil product exports over the total oil supply (Equation 2). 
Equation 2 Calculating oil net import dependence 
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟,𝑦𝑦 =  ∑𝐶𝐶 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟,𝑦𝑦 + 𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑟𝑟,𝑦𝑦–𝐶𝐶 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟,𝑦𝑦 − 𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟,𝑦𝑦𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟,𝑦𝑦  
where: 
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟,𝑦𝑦 = the net oil import dependence in region 𝑖𝑖 in year 𝑝𝑝, 
𝐶𝐶 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟,𝑦𝑦 = the total crude oil imports, 
𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟,𝑦𝑦 = the total oil products imports, 
𝐶𝐶 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟,𝑦𝑦 = the total crude oil exports, 
𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟,𝑦𝑦 = the total oil products exports, and 
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟,𝑦𝑦 = the total amount of oil in the primary energy supply. 
Representation of energy trade in the models 
All our models depict energy trade between regions. This approach excludes intra-
regional trade (such as imports to Germany from Norway). This is however 
consistent with energy security policies and measures which often treat energy 
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imports from neighboring suppliers differently than those from distant 
exporters24,66,67. 
Models differ on the types of energy trade they depict (Table 3). Energy import 
restrictions are imposed on all fuels which each model trades. Since all models 
represent oil, gas and coal trade, which account for almost all energy trade today, the 
starting point for regional net import level are similar. The scope of this paper is 
limited to trade in primary and secondary energy and excludes technological 
dependencies, which are also important for energy security23 and could significantly 
change under different energy scenarios. More work is needed to understand these 
vulnerabilities and their evolution in the future. 
Table 3 about here. 
It should be noted, that net imports are not constrained by taxing fossil fuel 
technologies. Rather, models make energy imports (including ‘new fuels’ such as 
biofuels and hydrogen for those models which depict it – see Table 3) less attractive 
either by hard constraints on energy imports (in the optimization models) or by 
imposing a tax on imported fuels (in IMAGE, the simulation model). As a result, the 
neutrality of emissions of this target is an endogenous outcome.  
Geographically, there are two main ways to represent energy trade in the models – 
bilateral trade and global pool trade. Under bilateral trade, one region sells energy 
directly to another region. In global pool trade, an energy exporter sells energy to a 
global pool which energy importers can buy from. For example in a model with only 
bilateral trade model, Middle Eastern oil exports would be sold directly to oil-
importing regions such as Europe or India. In contrast, in a model with global pool 
trade, the Middle East would first sell its oil exports to a global pool, from which oil 
importing regions could buy.  
Neither mechanism is a perfect representation of reality. Bilateral trade best 
represents direct trade between two countries such as natural gas trade in Europe 
where Russia sells natural gas directly to European countries and transports them 
via pipelines whereas global pool trade best represents much of the oil market. In 
IMAGE and TIAM-ECN, all energy trade is bi-lateral. In WITCH all energy trade 
goes through a global pool. REMIND also assumes a global pool but enhances this 
with differentiated regional trade costs to and from the pool. In MESSAGE, piped 
natural gas trade is bilateral between several regions (e.g. Europe and Russia) and all 
other energy trade goes through the global pool (including liquefied-natural gas and 
secondary fuels). The import restrictions are defined in the same way regardless of 
the energy trade mechanism and the results are robust regardless of which energy 
trade mechanism the model uses. 
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Implementing energy and oil independence targets 
The optimization models (MESSAGE, REMIND, TIAM-ECN and WITCH) achieve 
the target energy import levels by imposing constraints on the net-import volumes 
(in exajoules) and not on net-import dependence level (in %-terms). The net-import 
level is determined by multiplying the target in the Energy and Oil independence 
scenarios, the import restrictions are imposed as volume constraints in relation to 
the primary energy development in the Baseline (total primary energy supply for the 
all import scenarios and total primary oil supply for the oil scenarios) rather than as 
proportion constraints.  This avoids the model artifact of increasing the total primary 
energy supply (the denominator) to decrease overall energy dependence. IMAGE 
limits energy imports by imposing a tax on all imported energy. Since net import 
constraints include ‘new fuels’ such as biofuels and hydrogen for those models which 
depict it (Table 3), the neutrality of emissions of this target is an endogenous 
outcome. 
Modeling climate pledges 
The Pledges scenario depicts a world where all regions implement climate mitigation 
policies consistent with an ambitious interpretation of the Copenhagen pledges 
(Supplementary Table 1). This level of climate policy ambition is extrapolated beyond 
2020 by projecting the GHG emission reduction rate which is achieved under the 
specified technology and GHG targets from 2020 to 2100. The Pledges scenario 
which we analyze is generally consistent with the INDC emission range from the 
Climate Action Tracker68 over the short-term, which is also consistent with INDC 
2030 estimates from REMIND69 and PBL70. See the last column of Supplementary 
Table 1 for the regional GHG emission reduction rate in each region from 2020-2100 
and Kriegler et al.38 for model-specific implementation. 
Estimating policy costs and warming  
Policy costs represent consumption losses over GDP for MESSAGE, REMIND and 
WITCH, all of which have a macro-economic component. For TIAM-ECN, policy 
costs represent additional energy system costs over GDP. IMAGE costs are excluded 
because the model is not able to calculate energy independence costs in a comparable 
way to the model’s calculation of climate policy costs. GDP is expressed in market 
exchange rates. The real-world economic costs would depend on the choice of policy 
instruments and other factors. Costs do not include benefits from reduced warming.  
The estimate of warming under the Energy independence scenario is based on a non-
probabilistic parameterization of MAGICC 671; all temperature estimates represent 
the median temperature response which carry a +/- 20% range of uncertainty with a 
66% probability72.  
Uncertainty analysis 
The multi-model study design ensures that our findings are robust across model 
uncertainties including different solution mechanisms, representations of energy 
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trade and different methods for restricting energy imports (see Supplementary Note 
2 and Supplementary Table 11). The model uncertainty covered in our study also 
spans a wide range of the literature, in both key inputs and outputs. Supplementary 
Figure 12 shows the Baseline development of key input parameters in our models to 
the Baseline scenario space in the IPCC AR5 database; Supplementary Figure 13 
compares our key results for the 450 scenario to the 450 scenario space in the 
literature. We also test the robustness of our findings against parametric 
uncertainties by imposing the energy import restriction constraints in scenarios with 
three different Baselines based on SSPs45,73,74 which span a wide range of 
uncertainties (see Supplementary Note 3, Supplementary Figure 10). To test the 
robustness of our findings against the level of the import restriction target, we 
perform a sensitivity analysis using the MESSAGE model and vary the import 
restrictions both 50% higher and 50% lower than the main Energy and Oil 
independence scenarios (see Supplementary Note 4, Supplementary Tables 13 and 14 
and Supplementary Figure 11). 
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